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During the nearly two decades since the Supreme Court recognized a bifurcated
doctrine of personal jurisdiction, it has made little progress in defining the
characteristics that distinguish general and specific jurisdiction. One of the
issues that has repeatedly evaded the Court's attention is the scope of specific
jurisdiction. While we know that the scope of generaljurisdiction extends to any
suit brought against a defendant, and specific jurisdiction is limited to "suits"
that arise out of the defendant's contacts with the forum, the precise contours of
specific jurisdiction remain unclear. In recognition of this theoretical deficiency,
this article examines a particular category of cases-those involving
jurisdictionally insufficient counts that arise out of the same factual event as
jurisdictionally sufficient counts brought against the same defendant-to
illuminate the theoretical question surrounding the scope ofspecific jurisdiction.
The article concludes that in most instances there will be no constitutional or
statutory impediment to the federal court's exercise of pendent personal
jurisdiction regarding jurisdictionally insufficient counts that arise out of the
same constitutional case as a jurisdictionally sufficient anchor count, whether
the basis forjurisdiction over the anchor count is a nationwide service ofprocess
statute or a state long-arm statute. Finding constitutional support for the
exercise ofpendentpersonaljurisdiction pursuant to the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the article suggests that there is no
constitutional limitation that would require federal or state courts to define
specific jurisdiction narrowly according to particular legal theories supporting
recovery. Rather, the Due Process Clauses in both the Fifih and Fourteenth
Amendments support a broad interpretation of specific jurisdiction that would
allow afederal or state court to adjudicate the entire constitutional case brought
against a defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court recognized two distinct types of
personal jurisdiction: (1) general personal jurisdiction and (2) specific personal
jurisdiction.' While the Court has consistently maintained the distinction between
Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School.; J.D., Boston College Law School,
1989; B.S., University of Delaware, 1986. I would like to thank my colleagues Rosanna
Cavallaro, Joseph Glannon, and Susan Grover for generously offering their time and thoughtful
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Steven Torres, Jill
Morrissey, Joseph Ranssier, and Anthony Dellorfano for their valuable research assistance.
1 Specificjurisdiction confers "personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of
or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum," and general jurisdiction confers
"personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's
contacts with the forum." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8
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these two types of jurisdiction, together with the notion that specific personal
jurisdiction confers narrower jurisdictional authority than general personal
jurisdiction, the Court has never precisely defined the scope of specific personal
jurisdiction. Rather, the Court has stated that specific jurisdiction authorizes a
court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant for a "suit"2 or "litigation '3 that
arises out of the defendant's forum contacts. The Court's imprecision in this
regard creates both theoretical and practical problems. Theoretically, the Court's
failure to clearly define the scope of specific jurisdiction creates uncertainty
regarding the characteristics that distinguish specific jurisdiction from general
jurisdiction.4 Practically, the Court's imprecision creates difficulty when, for
example, a defendant is sued on multiple counts that all arise out of the same
factual event and some of the counts satisfy the constitutional and statutory
requirements for specific personal jurisdiction but other counts do not meet one or
both of the requirements.
If the scope of specific jurisdiction is defined in terms of particular legal
theories, a court's jurisdictional authority is limited to those counts against a
defendant that independently satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. This
jurisdictional authority, however, does not necessarily allow the court to
adjudicate the entire factual dispute against the defendant. If the scope of specific
jurisdiction is defined in terms of the factual event, however, the court's
jurisdictional authority extends to all of the counts against the defendant arising
out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the jurisdictionally sufficient counts,
thus permitting the court to adjudicate the entire dispute against the defendant.
Courts that have interpreted the scope of specific jurisdiction broadly in terms
of the nucleus of operative facts have relied upon the doctrine of pendent personal
jurisdiction. This article explores the constitutional and statutory authority
supporting the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction as an answer to the
practical problem of determining how to treat jurisdictionally pendent counts. The
article also suggests that the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction provides a
lens through which we may evaluate the theoretical concem surrounding the
& 9 (1984) (emphasis added).21d. at n.8; McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("It is sufficient for
purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which has a substantial connection
with Ithe forum] state.") (emphasis added).
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 (1985). The Court stated:
Where a forum seeks io assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has
not consented to suit there, this 'fair warning' requirement is satisfied if the defendant has
'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum... and the litigation results
from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities.
Id. (emphasis added).
4 While we know that specific jurisdiction confers narrower jurisdictional authority than
general jurisdiction, it is impossible to determine how much narrower the jurisdictional
authority is until we define the scope of specific jurisdiction.
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scope of specific personal jurisdiction. The article concludes that if pendent
personal jurisdiction is a permissible extension of specific personal jurisdiction,
then the scope of specific jurisdiction must extend to the entire constitutional case
brought against the defendant.5
II. THE PENDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION PROBLEM
While millions are now familiar with Jonathan Harr's book, A Civil Action,
6
detailing theplight of a group of neighbors from the small; working-class town of
Woburn, Massachusetts, who suffered grave consequences from contamination of
their local water supply, 7 few people are aware of the many ripples that resulted
from it. One such ripple was a lawsuit filed by John J. Riley, Jr. ("Riley") against
Harr and his publishers, alleging that the book defamed him, portrayed him in a
false light, and caused him emotional distress.8 Riley filed his lawsuit in the New
Hampshire Superior Court and the defendants removed the case to the United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction. Harr argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him with
regard to a slander claim arising out of comments Harr had made about Riley
during an oral presentation in Newburyport, Massachusetts. 9 Harr additionally
argued that he did not have sufficient deliberate contacts with New Hampshire
that gave rise to, or related to, the slander count to support personal jurisdiction
over him for this count.
If the slander count had been the sole count brought against Harr in New
Hampshire, Harr's argument would have had considerable strength. Although the
allegedly slanderous statements concerned the subject matter dealt with in the
book and involved statements about Riley that were similar to defamatory
statements included in the book the allegedly slanderous statements were
5The Court originally used the term "constitutional case" to define the scope of federal
subject matter jurisdiction under Article I of the Constitution. In United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, the Court stated that a constitutional case encompasses all legal theories for recovery that
arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact." 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
6 JONATHAN HARR, A CIVILACION (Vintage Books 1996).7A Civil Action spent more than one hundred weeks on the New York Times Best Seller
List, became a motion picture, and received the National Book Critics Circle Award for
Nonfiction. The book chronicled the Herculean efforts taken by one attorney to prove that the
defendants, W.R. Grace & Co., Beatrice Foods Co., and the John J. Riley Company were
responsible for pollution found in the Wobum municipal wells and the resulting deaths of five
Wobum children from leukemia. See Riley v. Harr, No. 98-712-M, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8596, at *3-*4 (D.N.H. Mar. 31,2000).
8Id. at *11. Specifically, Riley alleged the following seven counts: (1) intentional infliction
of emotional distress; (2) slander (against Harr only); (3) defamation; (4) invasion of privacy--
public disclosure of private facts; (5) invasion of privacy-placing the plaintiff in a false light;
(6) loss of consortium; and (7) a claim for enhanced compensatory damages. Id. at *2.
9Id. at *61-*63.
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communicated by Harr while he was present in Massachusetts-not while he was
in New Hampshire or pursuant to the circulation of the book in New Hampshire.
Thus, if the slander count was the only count filed against Hair in New
Hampshire, a court could have held that although Harr had established minimum
contacts with New Hampshire when he circulated the book, those contacts were
not closely enough related to the slander count to give rise to specific jurisdiction
in the forum.
The slander count, however, was not the sole count filed against Harr in New
Hampshire. Rather, it was joined with several other counts that arose out of the
circulation of the book. None of the defendants objected to the assertion of
personal jurisdiction with regard to the claims arising out of statements published
in the book. Presumably, the defendants believed that a court would find not only
that the defendant had minimum contacts with New Hampshire (because the
allegedly defamatory statements were published in a book that circulated in the
plaintiff s home state of New Hampshire), but also that it was foreseeable that the
plaintiff would suffer injury from any wrongful statements in New Hampshire. 0
In resolving Harr's motion, the court noted that "Harr's challenge to personal
jurisdiction with respect to [the slander count] implicates the complex and
unsettled doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction. If the doctrine were applied
here, it would not matter whether the court would otherwise have personal
jurisdiction over Harr with respect to the slander claim, standing alone."" In other
words, because specific personal jurisdiction existed over Harr with regard to the
counts arising out of statements in the book, if the court applied the pendent
personal jurisdiction doctrine, it could adjudicate the jurisdictionally insufficient
counts arising out of the same nucleus of operative facts as the jurisdictionally
sufficient counts.
Over fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court adopted the
minimum contacts doctrine in the now famous case of International Shoe v.
Washington.'2 Since then, the Court has attempted to define and refine the
nuances of the doctrine-sometimes with little success. Some of the key cases
have addressed difficult issues, such as: the quantitative 13 and qualitative
4
10 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,774 (1984).
"Riley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8596, at *62-*63. It is possible to argue that the slander
count against Harr did not arise out of the same operative facts as the counts arising out of the
circulation of the book. This possibility raises another very interesting question: How should
courts define the relevant set of operative facts to determine whether multiple counts arise out
of the same constitutional case? While this question is certainly one that could, and should, be
probed, it is not the subject of this article. Rather, this article addresses the larger question: when
multiple counts arise out of the same operative facts, is specific personal jurisdiction broad
enough to allow courts to adjudicate pendent counts?
2326 U.S. 310 (1945).
'
3 The quantity of contacts necessary to justify the exercise of jurisdiction depends upon
the type ofjurisdiction that is applied. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., the Court held
that a single contact may be sufficient to confer specific personal jurisdiction over a suit directly
[Vol. 62:16191622
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requirements of establishing minimum contacts; whether a defendant creates a
minimum contact with a forum by placing its product into the stream of
commerce knowing the stream is likely to carry the product to that forum;'5 and
whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment acts as an
instrument of interstate federalism.' 6 Yet, notwithstanding the Court's willingness
to address and attempt to resolve these difficult issues, the Court has given little or
no attention to one basic question: what is the scope of specific personal
jurisdiction?
Since the mid-1980s, the Court has recognized the distinction between
general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. Specific
jurisdiction confers a kind of "personal" jurisdiction over a defendant, but unlike
general personal jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction does not extend to any claim
that might be brought against that defendant. Rather, specific jurisdiction
authorizes a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only for a "suit" that
related to that contact. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,
on the other hand, the Court implied that a large quantity of contacts would be necessary to
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction. 466 U.S. 408, 416-19 (1984) (rejecting the exercise
of general jurisdiction where the defendant sent its chief executive officer to the forum for a
contract negotiation session, accepted a check drawn on a forum bank, purchased a large
quantity of goods and services in the forum for substantial sums, and sent personnel to the
forum for training).
14 In International Shoe, the Court stated that:
[Tjhe criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify
the subjection of a [defendant] to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply
mechanical or quantitative .... Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to ensure.
326 U.S. at 319. The Court refined this statement several years later when it stated that a
defendant must purposefully reach out to the forum in order to create a minimum contact. The
Court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant
cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State ... [lt is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State ....
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958).
"'Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(rejecting the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign defendant on the ground that such
jurisdiction would be unfair to the defendant under the facts of the case).
16The Court has been inconsistent in its discussion of this issue. Compare Ins. Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 n.10 (1982) (stating that the
Due Process Clause "is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns"), with World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (stating that "the Due Process Clause, acting as an
instrument of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render
a valid judgment").
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arises out of the defendant's forum contacts. 17 But it is not clear whether "suit"
refers to the legal theory that gives rise to each count or whether it instead refers
to the factual event that gives rise to a number of factually related counts. For
example, if a complaint is brought against a defendant for negligence and breach
of contract, both of which arise out of the same factual event, are there two "suits"
such that specific jurisdiction must be established over each count independently,
or is there a single "suit" encompassing the factual event that gives rise to both
counts?18 This is a question, posed in Riley v. Harr,'9 that is appearing in federal
litigation more and more frequently.
A court faced with the situation described in Riley has a number of
choices. It may: (1) dismiss only the counts that are jurisdictionally insufficient
and retain jurisdiction over the remaining aspects of the case; (2) dismiss the
entire case on grounds that one aspect of it is jurisdictionally insufficient and that
efficiency dictates that all of the counts should be tried together elsewhere; or (3)
retain jurisdiction over all of the counts on the ground that the jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied for one and all from a single claim that should be tried
together. While the first alternative is clearly within a court's authority, splitting
the dispute between forums raises issues concerning additional inconvenience,
potential for inconsistent verdicts, and systemic inefficiency. The second
alternative would be justifiable if the court concluded that the jurisdictionally
sufficient claim should be dismissed under the doctrine offorum non conveniens 0
because the public and private interest factors weigh in favor of trying the related
counts in one case.
2 1
The third altemative is the most difficult to justify. This alternative would be
justifiable only if the jurisdictionally insufficient count could "tag along" with one
or more other counts that were jurisdictionally sufficient on the theory that they
all formed a single "suit." If this premise is acceptable, a court may retain
17 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408,414 nn. 8 & 9 (1984).
" In an effort to avoid confusion of terminology, this article will refer to different legal
theories for recovery as a "count." A "claim" will refer to the set of operative facts which give
rise to an enforceable legal right.
'
9No. 98-712-M, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8596, at *62-*63 (D.N.H. Mar. 31, 2000).20 Alternatively, the court could cure the jurisdictional deficiency by transferring the case
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994) to a jurisdiction that would have a basis for jurisdiction
over each of the counts independently, if such ajurisdiction exists.21 The first and second alternatives rely upon the traditional but narrow interpretation of the
scope of specific jurisdiction that limits the court's jurisdictional authority to particular legal
theories. Data Disc., Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1289 n.8 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Famous Artists Corp., No. 95-5240, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3043, at *21 (E.D.
Pa., March 14, 1996); Debreceni v. Bru-Jell Leasing Corp., 710 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D. Mass.
1989); Bus. Trends Analysts v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Sun World Lines, Ltd., v. March Shipping Corp., 585 F. Supp. 580, 584-85 (E.D. Mich.




jurisdiction over all of the counts-including those that fail to satisfy personal
jurisdiction independently-if it determines that all arise out of the same factual
scenario and that it would not be unfair to subject the defendant to personal
jurisdiction over the entire constitutional case. This type of jurisdiction is most
frequently referred to as "pendent personal jurisdiction."22
To date, the Supreme Court has not considered whether the scope of specific
personal jurisdiction is broad enough to permit the exercise of pendent personal
jurisdiction.23 If the considerable level of attention that the issue has received in
the federal courts is any indicator, the issue is poised to reach the Court in the near
future. While discussion can be found in cases dating back to the mid-1950s, the
doctrine has been cited with increasing frequency during the last decade.24 The
Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and the District of Columbia Circuits have
considered and applied the doctrine.25 Additionally, more than fifty decisions by
22Since the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994), which confers supplemental subject
matter jurisdiction, several scholars have employed the term "supplemental personal
jurisdiction" to refer to the same concept that this article describes as pendent personal
jurisdiction. While either label may be appropriate, this article employs the label "pendent
personal jurisdiction" to avoid any implication that this doctrine derives from section 1367
itself. As currently written, § 1367 refers exclusively to subject matter jurisdiction. If Congress
chooses to amend § 1367 to expressly confer personal jurisdiction over pendent legal theories, it
would be appropriate to use the labels "supplemental personal jurisdiction" and "supplemental
subject matter jurisdiction." But without such an amendment, I believe that "pendent personal
jurisdiction" is the best label to avoid unnecessary confusion.
3 In fact, the Court has given very little guidance on the scope of specific personal
jurisdiction at all. Most scholars addressing the issue have done so in terms of defining the
"nexus" requirement-that is, the relatedness of a defendant's contacts to the forum with the
cause of action. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State
Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 82 (1980) (suggesting that the defendant's forum
contacts must form a substantively relevant fact that is part of a well-pleaded complaint in order
to satisfy the nexus requirement); William Richman, A Sliding Scale to Supplement the
Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1328, 1336-46 (1984)
(suggesting that there is an inverse relationship between the quantity of forum contacts and the
closeness of the relationship required between the cause of action and the contacts); see also
Linda Sandstrom Simard, Hybrid Personal Jurisdiction: It's Not General Jurisdiction, or
Specific Jurisdiction but Is It Constitutional?, 48 CAsE W. RES. L. REv. 559 (1998) (suggesting
that the Constitution does not require a causal link between the defendant's forum contacts and
the cause of action if the underlying purposes of specific jurisdiction are satisfied).
2 Pendent personal jurisdiction has bpen cited in over seventy reported decisions, and
approximately half of these citations have occurred after 1990.
25Each of these cases has involved personal jurisdiction over one count pursuant to a
federal statute that confers nationwide service of process and pendent personal jurisdiction over
factually related counts that did not satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction
independently. Robinson Eng'g Co. v. George, 223 F.3d 445, 449-50 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying
pendent personal jurisdiction to counts that were factually related to counts arising under the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act); ESAB Group v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617,
628 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying pendent personal jurisdiction to related state law counts joined
with RICO count, noting that 'Judicial economy and convenience of the parties is best
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United States District Courts discuss pendent personal jurisdiction, the majority of
which uphold the application of the doctrine.
2 6
These cases demonstrate that federal courts are willing to treat specific
personal jurisdiction as a source of jurisdiction strong enough to support their
adjudication of pendent counts. A closer look at these cases also suggests that a
hierarchy of specific personal jurisdiction is emerging. Federal courts are far more
willing to adjudicate pendent counts where personal jurisdiction over the anchor
count 7 is based upon a federal nationwide service of process provision28 than
where personal jurisdiction over the anchor count is based upon a state long-arm
statute.29
This article considers the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction as a means
of determining the scope of specific personal jurisdiction in federal court. Part III
facilitated by a consideration of all legal theories arising from a single set of operative facts")
(quoting Sohns v. Dahl, 392 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (W.D. Va. 1975)); IUE AFL-CIO Pension
Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1056-57 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying pendent personal
jurisdiction to related state law counts joined with a count brought pursuant to ERISA's
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act); Int'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166,
175 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, sub nom. Vesco v. Int'l Controls Corp., 442 U.S. 941 (1979)
(authorizing pendent personal jurisdiction over related state law counts joined with count
brought pursuant to Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H.,
556 F.2d 1, 4-5 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (applying pendent personal jurisdiction to related state law
counts joined with patent count); Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 554-55 (3d Cir.
1973) (applying pendent personal jurisdiction to related state law count joined with federal
securities count).26Most of these cases have involved personal jurisdiction over one count pursuant to a
federal statute permitting nationwide service of process and pendent personal jurisdiction over
factually related pendent counts. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. The application
of pendent personal jurisdiction in federal cases that do not involve a nationwide service of
process provision has been relatively rare. To date, the Second Circuit is the only appellate court
that has extended the application of pendent personal jurisdiction in a situation that did not
invoke a nationwide service of process provision. Hargrave v. Old Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716,
719 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying pendent personal jurisdiction in diversity case); see also Rice v.
Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting in dicta apparent approval of
district court's application of pendent personal jurisdiction in diversity case). Moreover,
application of the doctrine in state court cannot be found in reported decisions.27For purposes of this article, I refer to a count that independently satisfies the
requirements for specific personal jurisdiction as an "anchor count." This term is used
regardless of whether the basis for specific personal jurisdiction derives from a nationwide
service of process provision or whether it derives from a traditional minimum contacts analysis.28When personal jurisdiction over the anchor count is based upon a federal statute
providing for nationwide service of process, the court need only determine that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction is authorized by the statute and that it does not violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
29When personal jurisdiction over the anchor count is based upon a state long-arm statute,
the court must determine if the state statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction and if the
exercise of jurisdiction is permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See infra note 113.
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sets out the two classes of cases in which the issue of pendent personal
jurisdiction may arise in federal court, and Part IV sets forth the historical
development of the doctrine in each of these classes of cases. Part V analyzes
whether the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction in either of these classes of
cases violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Concluding that
the Fifth Amendment does not pose a barrier to the exercise of pendent personal
jurisdiction in either class of cases, Part VI then considers whether there is
statutory authority to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction pursuant to a
nationwide service of process provision or pursuant to a state long-arm statute and
the Fourteenth Amendment. I conclude by arguing that the present reluctance of
courts to adjudicate claims pendent to non-nationwide service of process counts is
unwarranted and that specific personal jurisdiction in both classes of cases is
constitutionally strong enough to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
an entire constitutional case.
IM. Two CONTEXTS IN WHICH PENDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION
MAY ARISE IN FEDERAL COURT
Pendent personal jurisdiction may arise in two different contexts in federal
court: (1) cases that invoke a nationwide service of process provision and (2)
traditional minimum contacts cases.30 Because the cases that arise in these
contexts involve different sources of jurisdiction over the anchor count, they
require separate analysis.
A. Federal Cases That Invoke a Nationwide Service ofProcess Provision
The most common context in which pendent personal jurisdiction occurs is
when a defendant is sued for multiple factually related counts, one or more of
which alleges the violation of a federal statute providing for nationwide service of
process. In this situation, the federal court will exercise personal jurisdiction over
the anchor count pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(D), which
vests the federal court with authority to exercise personal jurisdiction whenever
service of process is "authorized by a statute of the United States."31 Thus, the
court is permitted to exercise personal jurisdiction if such jurisdiction is permitted
by a federal statute and does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
30For purposes of this discussion, traditional minimum contacts cases are those that rely
upon a state long-arm provision and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for
the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The issue of pendent personal jurisdiction may also arise
in cases filed in state court. While this article focuses on the implications of pendent personal
jurisdiction in federal court, it should be noted that the analysis for traditional minimum
contacts cases filed in federal court is virtually identical to the analysis that would be applied to
a case filed in state court. See infra text accompanying notes 159-98.31FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(D).
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Amendment.32
Frequently, a complaint is filed that alleges multiple counts arising out of the
same operative facts. When some of the counts arise under a federal statute
providing for nationwide service of process and others arise under state law or
under federal law that does not specifically provide for service of process, a court
must determine whether it is authorized to adjudicate the entire dispute. In the
absence of pendent personal jurisdiction, a court must look to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) to assert personal jurisdiction over the factually related
counts that do not arise under the nationwide service provision. Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
authorizes a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant "who
could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
in which the district court is located." Thus, the court would have to determine if
the applicable state long-arm statute would permit the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the related counts and whether the exercise of jurisdiction would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. If pendent personal
jurisdiction is applied, the court may avoid the analysis under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) by
holding that the jurisdictional authority conferred by the nationwide service of
process provision extends to all counts that arise out of the same nucleus of
operative fact as the anchor count.
This situation is illustrated in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc.3 In ESAB,
the plaintiff brought suit alleging that a group of defendants engaged in a
conspiracy to appropriate the plaintiffs trade secrets and customer lists3 4 The
factual allegations supported six counts based upon state law and one count based
on civil RICO.35 The Fourth Circuit first considered whether personal jurisdiction
could be established pursuant to the state long-arm statute and the Fourteenth
32As is set forth more fully below, the Fifth Amendment is the source of constitutional
restraint on personal jurisdiction in this context, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment is the
source of constitutional restraint on personal jurisdiction in the other two contexts where the
basis for the court's assertion of jurisdiction is a state long-arm statute. See infra note 113 and
accompanying text.
33126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997).
34The plaintiff filed the complaint in its home state of South Carolina against two
defendants from New Hampshire and one defendant from Florida. The complaint alleged that
the New Hampshire defendants entered into a relationship with the Florida defendant by which
the Florida defendant gave the plaintiff's trade secrets and customer lists to the New Hampshire
defendants. All the relations between the defendants were carried out in and between New
Hampshire and Florida. The defendants' only alleged contact with South Carolina involved the
defendants knowing that their actions, if successful, would result in fewer sales to the plaintiff,
headquartered in South Carolina. In essence, the complaint alleged that the defendants intended
to gain a competitive advantage over the plaintiff by making sales that the plaintiff would have
otherwise made. The customer list included companies located across the United States and
Canada, with only one such company located in South Carolina. The evidence indicated that no




Amendment, as prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A).36
Noting that the South Carolina long-arm statute has been interpreted to extend to
the outer bounds permitted by due process,37 the court considered whether the
defendants had established minimum contacts with the forum such that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would not offend the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court held that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment because the defendants had not directed any conduct toward the
forum state.38 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "[a]lthough the
place that the plaintiff feels the alleged injury is plainly relevant to the inquiry, it
must ultimately be accompanied by the defendant's own contacts with the state if
jurisdiction over the defendant is to be upheld."39 Accordingly, the court held that
personal jurisdiction could not be exercised pursuant to Rule 4(k)(1)(A).40
Notwithstanding the court's conclusion that the exercise ofjurisdiction would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that personal jurisdiction did
exist with regard to the civil RICO count.41 Relying upon Rule 4(k)(1)(D), the
court held that the defendants were validly served with process pursuant to
RICO's nationwide service of process provision42 and such exercise of
jurisdiction did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.43 The
court then went on to apply pendent personal jurisdiction to the related state law
counts, noting that 'Judicial economy and convenience of the parties is best
facilitated by a consideration of all legal theories arising from a single set of
operative facts."" The court reached this conclusion even though it concluded
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants for the state law
counts, standing alone, would not have been permitted.
B. Traditional Minimum Contacts Cases
36Id. at 622.37Id. at 623 (stating that "the statutory inquiry necessarily merges with the constitutional
inquiry, and the two inquiries essentially become one") (quoting Stover v. O'Connell Assocs.,
Inc., 84 F.3d 132, 135-36 (4th Cir. 1996)).31ESAB Group, 126 F.3d at 623.39Id at 626.
4 0 1id
41Id. at 628.
42 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d) (1994) (authorizing service of process "in any judicial district in
which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs").43 ESAB Group, 126 F.3d at 627 (finding no violation of the Fifth Amendment because
there was no evidence of "such extreme inconvenience or unfairness as would outweigh the
congressionally articulated policy of allowing assertion of in personam jurisdiction").
44Id. at 628 (quoting Sohns v. Dah, 392 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (W.D. Va. 1975)). The court
relied upon United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, in which the Supreme Court addressed the
somewhat analogous situation arising in the context of subject matter jurisdiction. 383 U.S. 715
(1966).
16292001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURJAL
The second context in which pendent personal jurisdiction may arise is in
federal cases that do not rely upon a nationwide service of process provision. In
these situations, the court will rely upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(1)(A), which authorizes a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
a defendant "who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located." As previously noted,
invoking Rule 4(k)(1)(A) will require the federal court to consider whether the
state court would have statutory authority to exercise jurisdiction and whether the
exercise of jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.45 It is not uncommon for a complaint to allege multiple counts
arising out of the same operative facts. If one or more of the counts are found to
satisfy the state long-arm statute and the Fourteenth Amendment but other counts
fail to satisfy either or both of these requirements, the court must consider
whether it is authorized to adjudicate the entire dispute. In the absence of pendent
personal jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the counts that fail to satisfy the state
long-arm statute and/or the Fourteenth Amendment. If pendent personal
jurisdiction is applied, the court may extend its jurisdictional authority to the
jurisdictionally insufficient counts as long as they arise out of the same factual
dispute that gives rise to the jurisdictionally sufficient counts.
This situation is illustrated in Anderson v. Century Products Co.46 In
Anderson, the plaintiff filed an eight-count complaint alleging that Century
Products ("Century") stole a product idea that the plaintiff had offered to sell to
the company.47 Century filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Applying Rule 4(k)(1)(A), the court noted that the relevant
provision of the New Hampshire long-arm statute was coextensive with federal
law, and the two requirements thus "collapse[d] into the 'minimum contacts'
45While these requirements are considered statutory requirements, they in fact subsume
the relevant constitutional inquiry. Specifically, if the exercise ofjurisdiction is permitted by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as would be required by Rule 4(k)(1)(A), it
would necessarily be permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See supra
notes 1 14--22 and accompanying text.
46943 F. Supp. 137 (D.N.H. 1996).
47 The plaintiff, a resident of New Hampshire, invented an infant stroller which could also
serve as a car seat. Anderson contacted Century in Ohio to determine if it would be interested in
manufacturing and marketing the product. Century responded to Anderson's inquiry, invited
him to, submit further information describing his product, and requested that he execute the
company's Idea Submission Policy form. Anderson sent Century the executed Idea Submission
Policy form, drawings, and a written description of his invention. Shortly thereafter, Century
sent a letter to Anderson in New Hampshire rejecting the product proposal. Id. at 140. When
Anderson learned that Century had begun manufacturing and marketing an infant stroller
substantially similar to his invention, he filed a complaint in the United States District Court of
New Hampshire alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
misappropriation of confidential information, conversion, violation of New Hampshire's
Uniform Trade Secret Act, and violation of New Hampshire's Consumer Protection Laws. Id.
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analysis."" Focusing on the requirements imposed by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that while Century mailed its Idea
Submission Form to Anderson in New Hampshire and minimally corresponded
with him in New Hampshire, this was not sufficient to conclude that Century
satisfied the "purposeful availment" requirement of the Due Process Clause.49 The
court considered the communications and transactions between the parties and
found that Century's contacts with New Hampshire were not sufficient to find
that it had made a decision to inteiject itself into the New Hampshire market.5
With regard to the tort claims, however, the court did not limit its analysis to
the defendant's in-state contacts. Rather, the court noted that when a defendant,
"through out of state conduct, intentionally causes a tortious injury in the forum,
jurisdiction will lie for claims arising from that injury."'" The court held that the
situs of the tortious injury was New Hampshire; thus, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction with regard to the tort claims would not offend the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2 Thus, the court concluded that the defendant's contacts with New
Hampshire were sufficient under both the state long-arm statute and the
Constitution to confer jurisdiction over it with respect to the tort counts but not
with respect to the contract counts. 3
In an effort to avoid splitting up the suit, the Anderson court relied upon the
doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction to justify retaining jurisdiction over all of
the counts.54 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that "[ilt should not
4 1 d at 141.
49 Id. at 143; see Whitaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1083-85 (1st
Cir. 1973).50Anderson, 943 F. Supp. at 143.5 1id.521d. at 144.531d. at 142-45. The court offered the following justification for its conclusion:
[lit is necessary to examine why the fact that New Hampshire felt the 'effects' of
defendant's conduct is dispositive of the jurisdiction issue for the tort claim and not the
contract claim, even though both arise from the same harmful effects; namely, the
uncompensated loss of proprietary rights in the plaintiffs idea. The most apparent
difference, and the one that has constitutional significance between the two causes of
action, is the source of the rights at issue. With respect to torts, the state creates the rights,
whereas the parties themselves are the source of contractual rights. When the state defines
rights against tortious conduct, it is publicly proclaiming its will to deter that specific
conduct, and when ignored by individuals engaging in proscribed conduct, the state has a
heightened interest in judicially redressing any injurious effects felt within its borders. As
the Supreme Court has noted: 'A state has an especial interest in exercising judicial
jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its territory.'
Id. at 146 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770,776 (1984)).
SAnderson, 943 F. Supp. at 147. Pendent personal jurisdiction is used to acquire personal
jurisdiction over a count that is otherwise jurisdictionally insufficient but is joined with, and
arises out of, the same factual scenario as a jurisdictionally sufficient count against the
defendant.
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matter for jurisdictional purposes whether the plaintiff chooses to characterize the
conduct as a breach of contract or tortious or both."55 Again, the court reached this
conclusion notwithstanding the fact that it believed that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant for the contract count, standing alone, would not
be permitted.
IV. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PENDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IN FEDERAL COURT
A. Nationwide Service of Process Cases
The doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction had its origin in federal question
cases involving a claim arising under a federal statute providing for nationwide
service of process.56 Such counts were joined with one or more other counts
arising out of the same factual scenario but for which there was no independent
basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Analogizing to what is
today referred to as "supplemental jurisdiction," courts held that the factual
overlap between the jurisdictionally sufficient count(s) and the jurisdictionally
insufficient count(s) justified the exercise of personal jurisdiction over all of the
counts arising out of the common core of operative facts.
The first reported cases to raise the issue of pendent personal jurisdiction date
back to the late 1940s and early 1950s.57 Judges did not immediately embrace the
notion of pendent personal jurisdiction, frequently rejecting the doctrine because
Congress had not expressly provided for it in the statute that conferred jurisdiction
over the anchor claim 8 or because it appeared to impose too great a hardship
55 id.
5"Examples of federal statutes that provide nationwide service of process include: the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994); the Investment Company Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1994); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1994); the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 145 1(d) (1994); and patent statutes, see, for example, 35 U.S.C. § 293
(1994).
57See James S. Cochran, Personal Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal
Courts, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1463, 1468 n.22 (1986) (citing Schwartz v. Bowman, 156 F. Supp.
361 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) as one of the first cases to consider the merits of the doctrine and listing
other cases in which the issue had been raised but not addressed directly, such as Errion v.
Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956) and Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301,304,312 (S.D.N.Y.
1948)1.
5There are several other early cases rejecting the application of pendent personal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801 (D. Colo. 1964)
(refusing to apply pendent personal jurisdiction to state law claims joined with federal securities
claim), aff'd sub nom. Crist v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 343 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1965);
Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1964) (rejecting
extraterritorial service of process over pendent claims because Congress did not clearly express
its authorization of such process); Phillips v. Murchison, 194 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
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upon defendants.59 By the mid- to late-1960s, several federal district courts were
persuaded by notions ofjudicial economy and convenience to accept and apply
pendent personal jurisdiction in cases involving nationwide service of process
provisions.60 Few, if any, of these courts expressly considered whether this• 61
extension ofjudicial power exceeded their statutory or constitutional authority.
The Third Circuit was the first federal circuit court of appeals to expressly
uphold the application of pendent personal jurisdiction. In Robinson v. Penn
Central Co., the Third Circuit analyzed whether nationwide service of process
provisions in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
could provide a basis for pendent personal jurisdiction over factually related state
law claims. 62 In Robinson, the defendant did not contest whether extraterritorial
service could be made upon him under the federal statutes, and he did not contest
whether the state law claims were factually related to the federal claims. Rather,
(refusing to apply "ancillary service" over libel claim that was joined with federal securities
claim because it was not permitted by Congress in statute); Kappus v. Western Hills Oil, Inc.,
24 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (refusing to apply pendent personal jurisdiction over state law
claims joined with federal securities claim because Congress did not provide for such
jurisdiction in the statute); Lasch v. Antdies, 161 F. Supp. 851, 852 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (refusing to
apply "ancillary" personal jurisdiction over state law claim joined with federal securities claim
because Congress did not expressly provide for such jurisdiction in the Securities Act of 1933).
59See Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959) (refusing to apply pendent personal
jurisdiction on grounds of undue hardship where defendants argued that they were merely
nominal defendants with no interest in the outcome of the federal claim but sought to be
charged with damages on the pendent claims).
Some criticized the doctrine because it presented an opportunity for abuse by encouraging
plaintiffs to allege violations of federal law they otherwise would not allege. Id. at 198-99
(Moore, J., concurring). In fact, this would not seem to pose a large problem because if the
federal question claim were dismissed as insubstantial, the pendent claim would be dismissed as
well.
6OSee Puma v. Marriott, 294 F. Supp. 1116, 1121 (D. Del. 1969); Sprayregen v.
Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (deeming extraterritorial service of
process pursuant to section 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 sufficient to confer
pendent personal jurisdiction over related state claims); Kane v. Cent. Am. Mining & Oil, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 559, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (claiming that "the better view appears to be that
considerations of judicial economy and convenience of the parties which underlie the pendant
jurisdiction doctrine require that extraterritorial service also be sustained as to the nonfederal
pendant claims"); Cooper v. N. Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 980-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)
(stating that "reasons of judicial economy-which justify the judicially created doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction-suggest sustaining the service of process as to the pendent non-federal
claims"); Townsend Corp. of Am. v. Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.J. 1963).61See Sprayregen, 295 F. Supp. at 1378-79 (citing convenience and judicial economy as
justification for applying pendent personal jurisdiction and failing to mention constitutionality);
see also Kane, 235 F. Supp. at 568 (citing convenience and judicial economy as justification for
applying pendent personal jurisdiction and failing to mention constitutionality); Cooper, 226 F.
Supp at 980. "
62484 F.2d 553 (3d Cir. 1973).
16332001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
the defendant focused on whether the congressional statute authorized the federal
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant on the pendent counts.
The court viewed the issue as one primarily of statutory interpretation rather than
constitutional limitation and held that:
[Pendent personal jurisdiction] is merely an aspect of the basic pendent
jurisdiction problem.... Justification for entertaining such [pendent] claims 'lies
in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if
these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over
state claims.' 63
Several years after the Third Circuit decided the Robinson case, the Second
Circuit also applied pendent personal jurisdiction in a federal securities action,
expressing little or no constitutional concern about the doctrine. 4
While several of the early pendent personal jurisdiction cases dealt with
federal securities litigation, courts have applied the doctrine to claims arising out
of other federal statutes providing for extraterritorial service of process. In Oetiker
631d. at 555-56 (citations omitted).
64 nt'l Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 442
U.S. 941 (1979) (applying pendent personal jurisdiction to common law claims factually linked
to claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
The United States District Courts have also been receptive to the application of pendent
personal jurisdiction over common law counts that are factually linked to federal securities
actions. See, e.g., Mates v. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 814, 821 (D. Md. 1999)
(finding that pendent personal jurisdiction existed over state common law claim that arose out
of the same factual scenario as federal securities claim); FS Photo v. Picturevision, Inc., 48 F.
Supp. 2d 442, 445 (D. Del. 1999) (upholding exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction over
state claims and noting that "[a]lmost all of the courts that have considered the issue since 1970
have upheld pendent personal jurisdiction in cases arising under the Securities Act of 1933');
Nazareth Nat'! Bank & Trust v. E.A. Int'l Trust, No. CIV.A.90-1380-T, 1999 WL 549036, at
*3 (W.D. Pa. July 26, 1999) (stating that "[i]f plaintiff has asserted a cognizable rule lOb-5
claim, the court may also exercise pendent personal jurisdiction on a national-contacts theory as
to plaintiff's state-law claims"); Clapsaddle v. Telscape Int'l, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1090
(D.N.M. 1998) (holding that the court had pendent personal jurisdiction over state-law claims
that share common facts with lob-5 claims); Newman v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 794 F.
Supp. 1513, 1520 (D. Or. 1992) (finding that if a court has personal jurisdiction over a federal
securities claim, it may exercise personal jurisdiction over related state law claims); Clute v.
Davenport Co., 584 F. Supp. 1562, 1581 (D. Conn. 1984) (upholding pendent personal
jurisdiction over state securities claims that were factually related to federal securities claims);
S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114, 1123 (D. Mass. 1978) (upholding pendent
personal jurisdiction over state law securities claims); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F.
Supp. 559, 567 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (stating that "the better rule of law is that pendent personal
jurisdiction should be allowed in a case where pendent subject matter jurisdiction is justified');
Altman v. Deramus, 342 F. Supp. 72, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (upholding pendent personal




v. Werke,65 the D.C. Circuit Court held that 35 U.S.C. § 293, which provides for
extraterritorial service of process in patent suits, "enabled plaintiff to obtain
personal jurisdiction over the defendant with respect to any of his claims that
arose out of the same core of operative fact as those claims which clearly fell
within the scope of § 293. ',6 In reaching this conclusion, the court undertook no
express constitutional analysis of pendent personal jurisdiction but rather loosely
analogized the application of pendent personal jurisdiction to the application of
pendent subject matter jurisdiction.67 More recently, in IUE AFL-CIO Pension
Fund v. Herrmann,68 the Second Circuit upheld personal jurisdiction over an
ERISA pension plan's claim under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act (MPPAA) and applied pendent personal jurisdiction to state law claims that
arose out of the same nucleus of operative fact as the federal claim. 9
In 1997, the Fourth Circuit applied pendent personal jurisdiction to state law
counts joined with a RICO count in ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc.,70 noting
that:
Our recognition of pendent personal jurisdiction should present no constitutional
objection any more serious than did pendent jurisdiction involving the court's
subject matter jurisdiction. Once a court has a constitutional case, in the Article
I sense, properly before it, service by a court sufficient to assert personal
jurisdiction over a defendant by any authorized mechanism consistent with due
process may be held to apply to the entire constitutional case.
71
6'556 F.2d 1 (1977).
6Id. at4.
67Id. (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,725 (1966)).
689 F.3d 1049 (2d Cir. 1993).
69Id. at 1056-57. Other courts have applied pendent personal jurisdiction in ERISA cases.
See, e.g., AlliedSignal Inc. v. Blue Cross of California, 924 F. Supp. 34 (D.N.J. 1996); US
Telecom v. Hubert, 678 F. Supp. 1500 (D. Kan. 1987); Fulk v. Bagley, 88 F.R.D. 153
(M.D.N.C. 1980). But see, ag., Connors v. Marontha Coal Co., 670 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1987)
(declining to apply pendent personal jurisdiction in an ERISA case); Smith v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 567 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Colo. 1983) (refusing to apply pendent personal
jurisdiction in ERISA case).70126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997).
71 Id. at 628-29. Other federal courts have applied pendent personal jurisdiction in RICO
suits. See, e.g., Sadighi v. Daghighfekr, 36 F. Supp. 2d267 (D.S.C. 1999); Arkansas Blue Cross
and Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. 98-C2612, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4798, at *498
(N.D. 11. Mar. 31, 1999); Iron Workers Local Union No. 17 Ins. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 23
F. Supp. 2d 796 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Starlight Int'l. v. Herlihy, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Kan.
1998); Sullivan v. Rilling, No. 94C539, 1996 WL 650397 (N.D. 111. Nov. 6, 1996); Berg-Mfg.
v. Ivy/Mar Co., Inc., No. 94C539, 1996 WL 596512 (N.D. I1. Oct. 15, 1996); Caterpillar v.
Jerryco Footwear, 880 F. Supp. 578 (C.D. IIl. 1994); Mulhem v. W. Coast Video, Enter., Nos.
90C0417, 91C0711, 1992 WL 141990 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 1992); Bank of Crete v. Koskotas,
No. 88 Civ. 8412 (KMW), 1991 WL 177287 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 1991); Merchants Nat'l Bank
of Topeka v. Safrabank, No. 90-4194-R, 1991 WL 173781 (D. Kan. Aug. 28, 1991).
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These cases illustrate that during the last decade, the doctrine of pendent personal
jurisdiction has received considerable acceptance in suits where multiple counts
share a common nucleus of operative fact and at least one of the counts invokes a
federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process.
B. Traditional Minimum Contacts Cases
In traditional minimum contacts cases, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(1)(A) provides the statutory source of personal jurisdiction. Pursuant to this
rule, personal jurisdiction will exist if the exercise of jurisdiction (1) comports
with the long-arm statute of the state in which the federal court sits and (2) does
not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.72
To date, the Second Circuit is the only federal circuit court that has applied
pendent personal jurisdiction in a diversity case. In Hargrave v. Oki Nursery,
Inc.,7 the Second Circuit applied pendent personal jurisdiction in a diversity case
where the plaintiff asserted six claims based on the same nucleus of facts.74 The
court summarily concluded that the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction over all of these counts did not pose a constitutional issue.75
Turning to the long-arm restrictions, the court held that the allegations in the
complaint regarding fraud satisfied the requirements of the New York long-arm
statute, and thus, there was no question that the defendant was properly before the
court on at least one count.7 6 The court then turned its attention to whether the
long-arm statute permitted the plaintiff to assert additional legal theories that
arose out of the same basic facts as the count on which service was based.77
In answering this question, the court first looked to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4. Recognizing that Rule 4 does not expressly describe the reach of a
federal court's personal jurisdiction with regard to pendent legal theories, the
court considered whether Congress could confer such jurisdiction and, if so,
whether Rule 4 was intended to confer such jurisdiction in this situation.78 The
court reasoned that Congress has the power to grant the district courts subject
matter jurisdiction over entire controversies arising out of a common nucleus of
operative fact.79 By analogy, the court extended this reasoning to find that
72 Of course, the exercise of jurisdiction must also comport with state constitutional
requirements and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
71 646 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1980).
74 d. at 718. The plaintiff alleged fraud, breach of contract, breach of express warranty,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of warranty of fitness, and negligence.75 id.
761d. at 719.77Id. at 719-20.7 1Id. at 719.
79 W here multiple theories derive from a common nucleus of operative facts such that it
would be logical and efficient to try them together in one judicial proceeding, they are
considered "one 'case' within the meaning of Article III, Section 2 of the United States
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Congress could also confer personal jurisdiction over entire controversies. Next,
the court considered whether Rule 4 was intended to confer personal jurisdiction
over entire controversies. Noting that the word "actions" is commonly used to
refer to entire controversies, not just singular legal theories, ° the court cited
numerous statutes in which Congress conferred subject matter jurisdiction over
"actions."8' Relying upon these subject matter jurisdiction statutes as evidence of
Congress' intent to permit the district courts to entertain power over entire
controversies, and citing policy considerations concerning efficiency, the court
held that pendent personal jurisdiction should extend to all claims arising out of
the same nucleus of operative fact.8 2 Thus, the court held that pendent personal
jurisdiction could be exercised over all of the factually related counts in the
complaint, even though a New York state court would likely have held that the
long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction over the pendent claims. 3
Several points of interest arise from the Hargrave case. First, since the court
concluded that the assertion of jurisdiction over any of the counts would not
violate the Constitution, the court limited the reach of its holding to whether there
was statutory authority to assert jurisdiction in the case. We do not know if the
court would have reached a different conclusion if it felt that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the pendent counts would have violated the Constitution.
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the Second Circuit did not feel
compelled to mimic what a New York state court would have held under its own
long-aim statute. This is true even though the court was relying upon Rule
4(k)(1)(A), which explicitly refers to the jurisdictional limits of a state court of
general jurisdiction.
Other courts have employed pendent personal jurisdiction where state law
imposed limitations on the court's ability to exercise jurisdiction over the entire
controversy. 4 For example, in Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp.,85 the plaintifffiled
Constitution."Id.
80
"The word 'action' has been commonly understood to denote not merely a 'claim' or
'cause of action' but 'the entire controversy,' and is so used in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure." Id.
81 Congress has granted subject matter jurisdiction over "actions" between citizens of
different states (28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994)), "actions" arising under federal law (28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994)), "actions" arising under the anti-trust laws (28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1994)), actions
arising under the patents, copyright or trademark laws (28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994)), "actions"
under the civil rights legislation (28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994)), "actions" under the Securities
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994)), or "actions" under the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. § 412 (1994)).S2Hargrave, 646 F.2d at 720-21.
"Id. at 718-19 (citing Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 49 N.Y.2d 317, 324
(1980), in which the New York Court of Appeals held that the long-arm statute conferred
personal jurisdiction over a tort count but not a breach of contract count, even though they both
arose out of the-same facts).84 See Behlke v. Metalmeccanica Plast, S.P.A., 365 F. Supp. 272, 277 (E.D. Mich. 1973)
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a complaint against his former employer and supervisor. In counts one and two of
the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that both defendants were liable for retaliatory
discharge and defamation. In count three, the plaintiff alleged that his former
supervisor was liable for intentionally interfering with the plaintiff's employment
relationship.86 The supervisor moved to dismiss all three counts against him for
lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that the state law fiduciary shield
doctrine insulated him from personal jurisdiction in Illinois.87 The court held that
the fiduciary shield doctrine protected the supervisor from personal jurisdiction in
Illinois on counts one and two of the complaint but the fiduciary shield doctrine
did not apply with regard to count three.88 Finding that the allegations in count
three satisfied the Illinois long-arm statute and the minimum contacts doctrine, the
court held that personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant with regard to this
count.89 The court then went on to hold that pendent personal jurisdiction allowed
the court to exercise jurisdiction over counts one and two, notwithstanding the
fiduciary shield doctrine:
Since the first two counts are substantially interrelated to Count I and [the
defendant] is already properly before us on Count III, from the standpoint of
fundamental fairness as to contacts with and convenience of the forum, [the
defendant] loses nothing by being subject to our judgment on the other two
counts.
90
The court made no express analysis of whether Illinois law intended to make an
(holding that two of the plaintiffs three claims satisfied the long-arm statute, but the third claim
did not. Rather than dismiss the third claim, the court exercised pendent personal jurisdiction
with the following rationale:
Two theories for recovery, negligence and implied warranty, can stand independently
before the court as the basis for the exercise of power over the defendant Metalmeccanica.
The third theory for recovery, express warranty, would fail standing alone as the basis for
the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant Metalmeccanica. The theories are not
separate causes of action. They are but "different epithets to characterize the same group of
circumstances" and they "comprise one... case." The damage claimed as to each theory is
the same. The plaintiff would not be permitted to sue separately on each theory. Thus it
seems not unreasonable in this case to hold that since the court already had
Metalmeccanica before it for two parts of the same cause of action, it should assume
power over the defendant as to the third theory on the basis of the need to provide a
reasonable forum for the economical and expeditious trial of a single claim).
Id. 85763 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ill. 1991), af'don other grounds, 38 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 1994).
86Id. at 963.87Id. at 962.
88Id. at 965 (rejecting fiduciary shield with regard to count three because the complaint





exception to the fiduciary shield doctrine when a defendant was otherwise
properly subject to personal jurisdiction on a factually related claim.
Some courts have used pendent personal jurisdiction to avoid difficult
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process issues surrounding the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over pendent legal theories. 91 For example, in Salpoglou v. Widder,92
a court employed pendent personal jurisdiction where a breach of contract count
easily satisfied the minimum contacts test and the state long-arm provision, but a
related tort count posed some difficulties. In that case, the plaintiff, a
Massachusetts citizen, went to a Virginia doctor for cosmetic surgery after
reading an advertisement in a Washington newspaper that she purchased in
Massachusetts. After two failed surgeries in Virginia, the plaintiff asked the
doctor to compensate her for his mistakes by paying for another doctor to perform
a third operation. The third operation occurred in Massachusetts, and after several
telephone calls between the plaintiff in Massachusetts and the defendant in
Virginia, the doctor allegedly reneged on his agreement. The plaintiff
subsequently filed suit in federal court in Massachusetts alleging malpractice and
breach of contract.93
The Salpoglou court held that the defendant was subject to personal
jurisdiction. First, the court held that the breach of contract claim arose directly
from the defendant's purposeful forum activities because the contract was entered
into and breached during telephone calls to the plaintiff in Massachusetts from the
doctor's agents in Virginia. The court then cited other contacts with the forum,
91 In Home Owners Funding Corp. ofAm. v. Century Bank, the court avoided a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process analysis over two contract counts, noting that:
Because the Court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant Century in this
case with respect to the counts of negligent misrepresentation and 93A, and that therefore
it has personal jurisdiction over Century with respect to the other three counts... it need
not and does not decide at this time whether it otherwise has jurisdiction over Century with
respect to the two contract counts in the complaint under the contract-plus analysis.
695 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (D. Mass. 1988).
Similarly, in National "Write Your Own Congressman" Club v. Jackson, the court
avoided determining whether a breach of contract claim satisfied the requirements of due
process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, noting that "[b]ecause the court possesses
jurisdiction over Jackson with respect to National's tort claims, it also has personal jurisdiction
over Jackson with respect to National's breach of contract claim." No. 3:96-CV-1288D, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20806, at *8-*9 (D. Tex. Dec. 4, 1996). In Nelson v. R. Greenspan & Co.,
Inc., the court avoided the Fourteenth Amendment analysis as well as the long-arm analysis
surrounding the exercise of jurisdiction over a pendent breach of contract claim, noting only
that "plaintiff's breach of contract claim is based on the same core of operative facts as the fraud
claim and requiring plaintiff to bring the contract claim in another forum would result in
unnecessary duplicative litigation and waste ofjudicial resources." 613 F. Supp. 342, 346 (E.D.
Mo. 1985).
92899 F. Supp. 835 (D. Mass. 1995).
93 d. at 836-38.
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including the fact that the defendant held himself out as a plastic surgeon licensed
in Massachusetts, that he advertised in a Washington paper that had a limited
circulation in Massachusetts, and that he authorized the plaintiff to have some
preliminary testing performed in Massachusetts prior to the surgeries in
Virginia. 4 Finally, the court reasoned that because the defendant was subject to
the court's jurisdiction with regard to the breach of contract claim, "his
appearance on the malpractice claim [would] not impose a significant burden, and
litigating both claims simultaneously [would] further economy both for the
litigants and the court."9s Thus, the court held that the Massachusetts long-arm
statute and the Due Process Clause were satisfied and the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over both counts was permissible. 6
If the court had not resorted to pendent personal jurisdiction in this case, the
malpractice claim likely would not have independently satisfied the due process
requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. First, while there is a direct
causal link between the phone calls placed to the plaintiff in Massachusetts and
the breach of contract claim, these calls occurred after the alleged event giving
rise to the malpractice claim was over. Thus, if the minimum contacts test requires
a causal link between the purposeful contacts and the cause of action, there would
be no such link between the phone calls and the tort.97 Second, the remaining
contacts-holding himself out as a physician licensed in Massachusetts,
advertising in a Washington newspaper that was sold in Massachusetts,98 and
assenting to the plaintiff's request to have preliminary blood work done in
Massachusetts-provide a tenuous basis for the assertion of jurisdiction in
Massachusetts for surgery that occurred in Virginia.
Arguably, none of these contacts show that the defendant purposefully
reached out to Massachusetts in an attempt to induce Massachusetts citizens to
come to Virginia for his services. Moreover, even if these contacts are considered
"purposeful availment" of Massachusetts, it is dubious whether they would satisfy
the nexus requirement. The court avoided these difficulties by employing pendent
personal jurisdiction to the tort claim and concluding that it made sense to try the
claims together.99 While this result is economical, it is only justifiable if the
doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction is permissible-a question the court has
941d. at 838-39.
951d. at 838.
96Id. at 839.97The Supreme Court has never specified what type of relationship is necessary to satisfy
the nexus requirement.
98After the plaintiff first saw the defendant's advertisement in Massachusetts, she moved
to Maryland and saw a second advertisement by the defendant. After seeing the second
advertisement, she contacted the defendant to inquire about his services. Salpoglou, 899 F.
Supp. at 836.
99 d. at 838. The conclusion that the tort and contract claims arise out of the same nucleus
of operative fact for purposes of pendent personal jurisdiction is also questionable, given that




Not all courts that have considered pendent personal jurisdiction have
adopted the doctrine. The court considered pendent personal jurisdiction and
rejected its application in the recent case of Figawi, Inc. v. Horan.100 In Figawi,
the plaintiff filed a-seven-count complaint contesting the defendant's use of a
commercial logo.'0 1 The court found that the plaintiff had successfully made a
primafacie case that the fraud counts satisfied the relevant long-arm statute and
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.102 The court
went on to find, however, that the plaintiff failed to make aprimafacie showing
that the counts alleging unfair competition, dilution, and trademark infringement
satisfied the long-arm statute. 03 In light of its conclusion that only some of the
counts were jurisdictionally sufficient, the court held that the most appropriate
result was to limit the proceedings to issues that were material to the fraud counts.
The court dismissed the jurisdictionally insufficient counts. 10 4 In reaching this
conclusion, the court cited and rejected the reasoning of several cases that applied
the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction. 0 5 Specifically, the court stated that
pendent personal jurisdiction is not analogous to supplemental subject matter
jurisdiction because the two doctrines arise out of different constitutional
clauses. 0 6 Moreover, the court noted that "tendencies toward an expansive
concept of pendent jurisdiction---even pendent subject matter jurisdiction-have
been questioned and in some instances curbed, in more recent precedents that
move toward an increasingly claim-based and claim-specific explanation of the
scope and limits ofjurisdiction of federal trial courts."' 07
Other courts have implicitly rejected the policy of pendent personal
jurisdiction. For example, in Milford Power Limited Partnership v. New England
Power Co.,'08 the plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint alleging that the
defendant, New England Power (NEP), had breached an agreement to purchase
energy.'09 The defendant responded by filing a counterclaim against the plaintiff
'o 16 F. Supp. 2d. 74 (D. Mass. 1998).
'
01 The seven counts in the complaint alleged: (1) unfair competition under the Lanham
Act; (2) the use of the logo would create consumer confusion under the Lanham Act; (3)
dilution of value of the logo; (4) trademark infringement under Massachusetts common law; (5)
common law unfair competition; (6) violation of Massachusetts General Laws ch. 93A; and (7)









108918 F. Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1996).
09 Id. at 476-77. The complaint alleged the following: deceit and fraudulent inducement,
negligent misrepresentation, breaches of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, interference with advantageous business relations, violations of the RICO Act, and
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and several additional parties in the counterclaim." ° The counterclaims arose out
of allegations that the defendants in counterclaim conspired to blackmail NEP in
relation to the original contract to purchase energy. The counterclaims alleged that
the conspiracy culminated at an October 1994 meeting in Massachusetts."' Two
of the defendants in a counterclaim filed motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. The court held that personal jurisdiction existed with respect to the
counts that arose out of the October meeting in Massachusetts, specifically the
claims of civil conspiracy, violation of chapter 93A, § 11 of the Massachusetts
Code, defamation, and abuse of process. The court dismissed the remaining
counts, concluding that because they did not arise out of the October meeting,
these counts did not meet the Massachusetts long-arm statute requirement of a
tortious act or omission to occur in Massachusetts. The court did not consider,
however, whether it could exercise pendent personal jurisdiction.
These cases illustrate that the federal courts are reluctant to apply pendent
personal jurisdiction in traditional minimum contacts cases. Even among those
courts that have adopted the doctrine in this context, the statutory and
constitutional rationale for the doctrine has not been fully fleshed out.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE PENDENT PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL COURT
The federal judicial power derives from Article 11 of the Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to create lower federal courts and to define the subject
matter jurisdiction of those courts. While Article III imposes limits on Congress'
power to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts, it does not
control Congress' power to confer personal jurisdiction. Rather, the only
constitutional restriction on the federal courts' authority to exercise personal
jurisdiction flows from the Due Process Clause.1 2 The Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment limits Congress' power to confer personal jurisdiction through
federal long-arm statutes. 1 3 Thus, in order to determine whether Congress has the
power to grant personal jurisdiction over pendent legal theories, we must consider
whether such jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
violations of MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 93A, § 11 (1997).
"
0 Milford Power, 918 F. Supp. 471. The claims against the defendants in counterclaim
were: civil conspiracy, defamation, abuse of process, violation of chapter 93A, § 11, and
breaches of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
"1 Id.
"
2 Ormni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff& Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).
113 LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPHU. WHm'EN, CIVILPROCEDuRE 300 (2d ed. 2000) ("[T]here
is universal agreement that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment limits the power of
Congress to enact federal long-arm statutes, while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment limits the power of state legislatures to enact state long-arm statutes.').
1642 [Vol. 62:1619
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Although it is well established that due process limitations on the federal
courts' personal jurisdiction derive from the Fifth Amendment rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment," 4  the Supreme Court has never defined the
jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Fifth Amendment."15 Rather, the Court's
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence pertains only to limitations on state court
jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. In light of the
absence of direct Court guidance, and in recognition of the similarity of the due
process clauses of these two amendments-both in language and motivating
policies-courts have looked to opinions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause for guidance in interpreting the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause."
16
The Court has clearly established that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause requires that a defendant "have certain minimum contacts with
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.""' 7 The limits of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment are designed to provide fair warning to a defendant
that if he or she purposefully directs activities toward a forum, such activities will
render him or her subject to jurisdiction in that forum." 8 Once the court has
determined that a defendant has purposefully directed his or her activities toward
the forum, thus creating minimum contacts, "the[se] contacts may be considered
in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice.""' '.9
Applying these principles to the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, a
number of courts and commentators have suggested that the appropriate
jurisdictional standard under the Fifth Amendment is a national contacts test that
"4Id; see also Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxemborg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935,
942 (1 Ith Cir. 1997) (noting that when a federal statute provides the basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction, it is well established that the Due Process limitations derive from the Fifth
Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment).
"
5BCCIHoldings, 119 F.3d at 944.
"
6Id. at 944 (citing In re Chase and Sanbom Corp., 835 F.2d 1341, 1345 (1 lth Cir. 1988),
overruled on other grounds in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); see also
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331-32 (relying on Fourteenth Amendment cases to
interpret Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment).
17 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
11 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,472 (1985).
"
9 Id. at 476 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320). Other factors employed in the minimum
contacts analysis include "the burden on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,"
"the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies," and the "shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980).
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is supplemented by considerations of fairness to the defendant. 120 The national
contacts approach first considers whether the defendant has purposefully directed
his activities toward the United States and, if so, whether the exercise of
jurisdiction comports with notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Applying the national contacts standard to pendent personal jurisdiction, it
becomes difficult to imagine a situation that will violate the Fifth Amendment.
First, minimum contacts with the nation will generally be easy to establish. For
example, any defendant who is a citizen of the United States will have sufficient
minimum contacts with the nation to support general personal jurisdiction, just as
a citizen is subject to general jurisdiction in his or her respective home state.
Moreover, a corporate defendant that is incorporated in the United States or that
maintains a place of business in the country, will have sufficient minimum
contacts with the nation to support general jurisdiction.121 Even when the
defendant is not a citizen of the United States and has no physical presence there,
the national contacts test merely requires that the defendant have purposeful
minimum contacts with the nation in order to give rise to a suit. Where a court has
personal jurisdiction over an anchor count that arises out of the same factual event
as a pendent count, it is likely that the pendent count will be sufficiently
connected to the defendant's contacts with the country to support minimum
contacts.
122
The second prong of the analysis, fairness, is also likely to be satisfied
because the defendant is already before the court on a related count. Specifically,
the burden on the defendant would be relatively insignificant given that the
defendant must litigate the anchor count in the forum, the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief will be furthered by allowing the
plaintiff to resolve the entire controversy in a single forum, and the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
1204 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1067.1 (2d ed. 1987); Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 38 (1984); Robert A. Lusardi,
Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign, 33
VILL. L. REv. 1, 32-38 (1988); see also Peay v. Bellsouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206
(10th Cir. 2000); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxemborg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935,
945-46 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (citing cases); Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O'Brien, 11 F.3d 1255,
1257-58 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing cases).
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has explicitly declined to address the
constitutionality of the national contacts test. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 103 n.5 (1987) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court of California,
480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (plurality opinion)).
121BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d at 948.
122The national contacts test is generally an easier test to satisfy than the traditional
minimum contacts test because the court may consider all the defendant's contacts with the
country in the aggregate, rather than limiting the analysis to contacts with a particular state, as
would be necessary under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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controversies would be furthered by allowing pendent counts to be adjudicated
along with factually related counts. It would be an unusual situation where the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the pendent count would be so unfair that it
would require the court to refuse to adjudicate the entire controversy.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, I conclude that there is constitutional
authority to allow federal courts to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction.
VI. STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE PENDENT PERSONAL
JuRISDICTION IN FEDERAL COURT
A. Service ofProcess Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Service of process is the means by which a court asserts personal jurisdiction
over a defendant'2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k) permits the federal
courts to establish jurisdiction over a person through service of a summons. 124
Accordingly, one must consider whether Rule 4 is intended, either expressly or
impliedly, to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over jurisdictionally
insufficient counts that are factually related to a jurisdictionally sufficient
count.
125
When interpreting a statute or rule, the initial inquiry should be to ascertain
the plain meaning of the statutory language.12 6 Rule 4(k)(1) begins by stating that
"[s]ervice of a summons or filing a waiver of service is effective to establish
jurisdiction over the person of a defendant' if the circumstances described in one
' Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5 (1980); Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438,444-45 (1946).
124 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) provides that service of a summons is effective
to establish jurisdiction over the person of a defendant:
(A) who could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the
state in which the district court is located, or
(3) who is a party joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19 and is served at a place within a
judicial district of the United States and not more than 100 miles from the place from
which the summons issues, or
(C) who is subject to the federal interpleaderjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, or
(D) when authorized by a statute of the United States.
Additionally, Rule 4(k)(2) provides that a defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state may be subject to a federal court's personal
jurisdiction with respect to claims arising out of federal law as long as the exercise of
jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.
125It should be noted that while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 states that "[t]hese
rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts
or the venue of actions therein," it has been interpreted to refer to subject matter jurisdiction
only, and therefore does not limit personal jurisdiction. 14 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACrncE § 82.02 (3d ed. 1997).
16 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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of the rule's subsections A through D are present. Notably, this prefatory
language does not limit the reach of the court's personal jurisdiction to specific
claims.127 This language contrasts with section 2 of Rule 4(k) which provides that
"serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to
claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person
of any defendant.' 128 By including the language limiting the court's jurisdiction to
particular claims in section 2 of the rule and omitting any similar restriction in
section 1 of the same rule, the plain language of the rule suggests that section 1 is
not intended to be limited to particular claims. 
12 9
The weakness of this argument is that if Rule 4(k)(1) does not pose any limit
on the reach of personal jurisdiction, a defendant who is subject to jurisdiction on
one count could then be subject to jurisdiction on any other count, whether
factually related or not. Such an interpretation would blur the distinction between
general and specific personal jurisdiction 3 Thus, to the extent that specific and
general jurisdiction are permanent fixtures in the personal jurisdiction landscape,
the language of Rule 4(k)(1) is ambiguous because it supports an interpretation
that is contrary to the constitutional structure of the doctrine wherein specific
jurisdiction confers less jurisdictional authority than general jurisdiction.
When a statute is ambiguous or silent as to a relevant issue, courts will look
to the legislative history to facilitate the interpretation of the statutory language in
a manner that would further the legislative goal.13' Applying this rule of
construction to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally, and to Rule 4
specifically, provides evidence that the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction is
127The subsections of Rule 4(k)(1) that follow this preface also omit any language
restricting jurisdiction to the claim that forms the basis for service of the summons. Sections A
through C of the rule define the requirements for amenability to service of summons in terms of
the "defendant" rather than the claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1). For example, the language of
section A refers to a defendant "[w]ho could be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state in which the district court is located." Id. Similarly, the language
of section B refers to a defendant "[w]ho is a party joined under Rule 14 or Rule 19," and the
language of section C refers to a defendant "[w]ho is subject to the federal interpleader
jurisdiction." Id. Section D uses slightly different language-permitting service of a summons
"when authorized by a statute of the United States"-but does not restrict jurisdiction to
particular claims. Id.121 FED. R. Cwy. P. 4(k)(2) (emphasis added).
129 Where the legislature uses particular language of construction in one section of a statute
and different language in another similar section of the same statute, it intends something
different in each case. United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720,722 (5th Cir. 1972).130Pendent personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, would retain the distinction between
these two categories of jurisdiction but would extend the reach of specific jurisdiction to all
legal theories for recovery that arise out of the same factual scenario.
131 See, e.g., United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606-10 (1986) (employing legislative
history to ascertain statutory meaning); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (using
legislative history to discern statutory meaning); see also 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 40-41 (5th ed. 1992).
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consistent with the intent of the rules.
One of the primary objectives of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to
enable the federal courts to determine entire controversies at one time. Rule 1
states as much by declaring that the rules "shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.' '132 As
noted by the Second Circuit, "[t]he word 'action' has been commonly understood
to denote not merely a 'claim' or 'cause of action' but the 'entire controversy,'
and is so used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' '133 That the rules seek to
facilitate the adjudication of whole controversies is evidenced by the procedures
established by the rules. Rule 8 permits a litigant to plead multiple theories arising
out of the same operative facts. In fact, a litigant is expressly permitted to plead
not only multiple theories arising out of the same facts but even multiple
contradictory theories. 134 If a litigant fails to present a count and the statute of
limitations passes before the litigant realizes the error, Rule 15 allows the litigant
to request permission to amend the complaint and add the omitted count as long
as it relates to the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of a pending
count. 35 The rules ofjoinder also enable the court to resolve entire controversies
by allowing the parties to bring as an original claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim
any counts they have against a party already named in the lawsuit that arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of a pending count. 3 6 The
scope of discovery extends to any unprivileged matter that is "relevant to a claim
or defense involved in the pen ding action."' 137 Relevance is broadly construed and
allows discovery of facts relating to the underlying event, not merely facts that
will be admissible at trial to prove the elements of the legal theory that is
pleaded.3 8 Finally, the rules also provide that:
[w]hen actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all matters in issue in the
actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
132FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
'
33Hargrave v. Old Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716, 719 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Harvey
Aluminum, Inc. v. Amer. Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1980)). For other instances
where the word "actions" has been used to refer to the equivalent of a constitutional case, see,
for example, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-43 (1974) (civil rights); Int'l Controls Corp.
v. Vesco, 593 F.2d 166, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979) (securities); Leon Finker, Inc. v. Schlussel, 469
F. Supp. 674,679-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (trademark).
34FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e).
135 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c).
136 FD. R. Civ. P. 18, 13. In fact, Rule 13(a) requires a defendant to join all counterclaims
that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim.






The advisory committee's notes to Rule 4 provide additional, albeit limited,
support for pendent personal jurisdiction. Rule 4 was significantly overhauled in
1963 when a provision was added allowing a federal court to serve process
outside of the state where the court is located when a state law would allow the
same type of service by a state court.140 That same year, Rule 4 was also amended
to incorporate the "100-mile provision," which allows service of a summons on
an additional party if he or she is served within one hundred miles of the court
that issued the summons.141 The advisory committee's notes for the 1963
amendments to the rules state that "[t]he bringing in of parties under the 100-mile
provision in the limited situations enumerated is designed to promote the
objective of enabling the court to determine entire controversies.' 142
Rule 4 was significantly amended again in 1993 and Rule 4(k) was adopted
in its present form. In the accompanying advisory committee's notes, the
following paragraph discussed the reach of Rule 4(k)(2),143 stating:
This narrow extension [apparently referring to Rule 4(k)(2) specifically] of the
federal reach applies only if a claim is made against the defendant under federal
law. It does not establish personal jurisdiction if the only claims are those arising
under state law or the law of another country, even though there might be
diversity or alienage subject matter jurisdiction as to such claims. If, however,
personal jurisdiction is established under this paragraph with respect to a federal
claim, then 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides supplemental jurisdiction over related
claims against that defendant, subject to the court's discretion to decline exercise
of that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).1"
The above paragraph is frustratingly ambiguous because the reference to
"supplemental jurisdiction over related claims"'145 does not specify whether it is
referring to subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. Supplemental
jurisdiction, as established in section 1367, typically refers to supplemental
139 FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
14028 U.S.C. app. at 642-43 (1994) (FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) advisory committee's notes).
141Id. at 643 (FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) advisory committee's notes).
142 id
14 Rule 4(k)(2) was the product of the 1993 amendments and it provides:
If the exercise ofjurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to
claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any
state.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).




subject matter jurisdiction.146 However, the phrase "supplemental personal
jurisdiction" is also found in legal literature.147
Looking at the context of the paragraph, the advisory committee's note
provides limited support for the assertion of pendent personal jurisdiction. First,
the comment pertains to Rule 4(k), a rule which deals exclusively with personal
jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. Second, the language of the comment
focuses on how far the rule extends the reach of personal jurisdiction.
Specifically, the first sentence of the comment expressly limits the reach of Rule
4(k)(2) to cases where at least one claim arises under federal law. The second
sentence emphasizes this point by stating that personal jurisdiction will not be
established under the rule if all of the claims arise out of state law--even if there
is a basis to assert subject matter jurisdiction over such related state claims.
Lastly, the third sentence explains that when there is a claim involving federal
law, Rule 4(k)(2) may provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over that claim and
"supplemental jurisdiction"'148 will provide a basis for jurisdiction over related
claims. While it is plausible that this third sentence is merely stating that
supplemental subject matter jurisdiction would apply to the state claims, such an
interpretation leaves unanswered the question of whether the court would have
personal jurisdiction over the related state law counts. If, on the other hand, one
interprets that third sentence as referring to supplemental personal and subject
matter jurisdiction, the sentence would complete the thought initiated in the first
and second sentences by stating that personal jurisdiction would extend to cover
all of the counts that arise out of the same operative facts as the federal
question. 149 Thus, while the advisory committee's notes to Rule 4 are undeniably
ambiguous, the reference to the court's power to exercise "supplemental
jurisdiction over related claims"'50 at least implies that Rule 4 is intended to
encourage adjudication of related claims in one suit.
Further evidence that the federal courts are encouraged to adjudicate entire
controversies at one time may be found outside of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Supplemental jurisdiction encourages the consolidation of factually
14628 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
147 See, e.g., 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1125 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp.) (referring to "supplemental (pendent) personal
jurisdiction'); ROBERT C. CASAD, PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL QUESTION CASES 1606
(1992) (referring to "supplemental personal jurisdiction").
14828 U.S.C. app. at 654 (FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's notes).
149 One problem with this interpretation is that the quoted language refers to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, which is commonly considered a source of supplemental subject matter jurisdiction.
The language of sections 1367(a) and (c), however, may be read loosely to confer both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over claims that form part of the same case or controversy
under Article I11. While this interpretation is possible, it is not the prevailing interpretation of the
statute at this time. Virtually all courts refer to supplemental jurisdiction as a source of
supplemental subject matter jurisdiction.
15028 U.S.C. app. at 654 (FED. R. CIv. P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee's notes).
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related counts between parties before the court by providing a basis for federal
courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over jurisdictionally insufficient
counts that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as a jurisdictionally
sufficient count. 5 Resjudicata similarly encourages litigants to bring all of their
factually related claims in one suit. Where a litigant voluntarily appears, presents a
case, and is fully heard, all issues arising out of the same controversy are barred
from further adjudication by the laws of res judicata.15 2 Looking at the
framework established by these rules and policies, the message is clear that the
federal courts are encouraged to adjudicate entire controversies whenever
possible.
Tying these threads together, one may conclude that although the plain
language of Rule 4(k) is ambiguous as to the reach of personal jurisdiction, the
goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally, and the intent of Rule
4(k) specifically, support an interpretation of the rule that would allow pendent
personal jurisdiction over jurisdictionally insufficient counts arising out of the
same factual event as one or more jurisdictionally sufficient counts. Rule 4,
however, is not the sole source of authority for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in federal court. Rather, Rule 4 authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction
when it is authorized by a federal or state long-arm statute. Thus, in order to
determine if there is statutory authority to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction,
one must consider the relevant long-arm statute.
B. Service ofProcess Pursuant to a Federal Statute Conferring
Nationwide Service ofProcess
In pendent personal jurisdiction cases where there is an anchor count arising
under a nationwide service of process provision, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(1)(D) states that service of a summons is effective to establish personal
jurisdiction over a defendant "when authorized by a statute of the United States."
To determine whether pendent personal jurisdiction is authorized in this context
one must consider how these two sources of authority-Rule 4 and the applicable
federal statute-relate to each other. One interpretation would suggest that once
personal jurisdiction is established under Rule 4(k)(1)(D) pursuant to a federal
statute authorizing personal jurisdiction over at least one count in the case, the
reach of the court's jurisdiction is determined by Rule 4. Because Rule 4 does not
expressly describe the reach of the court's personal jurisdiction, the rule would be
interpreted according to the overall goals of the federal procedural structure. As
noted previously, one of the primary goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is to encourage resolution of entire controversies at one time, and thus, pendent
personal jurisdiction would be a permissible extension of judicial power.
"' 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994).
152 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931).
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An alternative interpretation of Rule 4(k)(1)(D) would be that the reach of the
court's jurisdiction is intended to be defined by the underlying federal statute that
provides the basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Pursuant to this
interpretation, the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction must be authorized by
the federal statute that provides jurisdictional authority over the anchor count
Congress has adopted a number of federal statutes that permit nationwide service
of process. While these statutes provide a basis for personal jurisdiction pursuant
to Rule 4(k)(1)(D), they are generally silent on the issue of whether personal
jurisdiction should extend to factually related pendent counts. 153 To the extent that
these statutes fail to directly address the issue of pendent personal jurisdiction,
one may look to the legislative purpose supporting the statute to provide guidance
in interpreting it.154 Professor Maryellen Fullerton of the Brooklyn School of Law
has identified several primary interests furthered by most congressional grants of
nationwide jurisdiction. They include the desire to provide a forum for litigation
regarding: (1) problems affecting the national economy, for example, the
regulation of securities or antitrust matters; (2) suits involving multiple defendants
where no single state has the power to completely resolve the controversy; and (3)
suits involving many plaintiffs in distant locations. 155 Overall, the congressional
goal is to provide at least one convenient federal forum for these types of statutory
claims.' 56 To the extent that pendent personal jurisdiction would allow the federal
claim to be heard in its full context, without bits and pieces being severed and
adjudicated in another forum, such jurisdiction would further the general
congressional objectives of these provisions. 7
Thus, to the extent that pendent personal jurisdiction furthers the legislative
goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the federal statute that confers
personal jurisdiction over the anchor count, federal courts should have statutory
permission to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction when the anchor count
153 See Jon Heller, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 113, 131 (1989).
"5 United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597,606-10 (1986); INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214,218
(196q; Fullerton, supra note 120, at 63-70.
:
56 Heller, supra note 153, at 133.
'
57Id. at 136 (citing Amtrol, Inc. v. Vent-Rite Valve Corp., 646 F. Supp. 1168, 1175 (D.
Mass. 1986)). Further, if litigants are required to adjudicate their federal claims in a different
forum than related state claims, plaintiffs may decide to forego one legal theory-possibly the
federal one-to avoid the expense and inconvenience of maintaining separate actions in
different forums. Thus, allowing pendent personal jurisdiction would promote the legislative
goal of providing a convenient forum for the federal statutory claim. Finally, if a federal count is
separated from the related state count because pendent personal jurisdiction is rejected, any
issues that are determined in the federal action adversely to the plaintiff may preclude the
plaintiff from relitigating that issue in a state action conceming the related claim. This
possibility could discourage plaintiffs from bringing their federal counts separately. Heller,
supra note 153, at 136-37.
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invokes a nationwide service of process provision."5 8
VII. SERVICE OF PROCESS IN TRADITIONAL MINIMUM CONTACTS CASES
The most frequently invoked source of authority for service of summons in
federal court is Rule 4(k)(1)(A).5 9 Under this rule, service of a summons is
effective to establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant who could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state in which
the district court is located. State courts, of course, may only exercise jurisdiction
if permission is granted in the state's long-arm statute and if the assertion of
jurisdiction does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.160 Rule 4(k)(1)(A) compels the federal court to satisfy these same
requirements.16
The language of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) provides a basis for the initial assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant "who could be subjected to the jurisdiction
of a court of general jurisdiction, 162 but once jurisdiction is established, the rule
is silent with regard to the reach of the federal court's authority. As noted
previously, the text of Rule 4(k) is ambiguous on this point and may reasonably
support multiple interpretations.
One interpretation of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is that once the court acquires personal
jurisdiction over at least one count in the complaint, the court's power extends to
authorize the exercise ofjurisdiction over the entire factual dispute.163 Pursuant to
this interpretation, federal courts would be permitted to hail a defendant into court
if at least one count satisfied the requirements of the relevant state long-arm
statute and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the court
158 While this article concludes that the federal courts have statutory permission to exercise
pendent personal jurisdiction, the courts are not compelled to exercise this power. Rather, the
determination of whether to exercise such jurisdiction is a discretionary one.
159 Other sections of Rule 4(k) provide authority for service of summons in particular
circumstances-when a defendant is joined pursuant to Rule 14 or 19, when a defendant is
subject to federal interpleader jurisdiction, when a federal statute authorizes nationwide
jurisdiction, or when a defendant is not subject to the general jurisdiction of any state court-
but outside of these particular situations, Rule 4(k)(1)(A) provides the primary rule for service
of summons in most federal cases. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).
160 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL et al., CIVIL PROCEDURE 143-44 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing three
hurdles to obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant: (1) language of the long-arm statute; (2)
judicial interpretation of the language of the long-arm statute; and (3) federal and state
constitutional standards).
161 It is important to note that under Rule 4(k)(1)(A), a federal court must meet the same
jurisdictional requirements as a state court regardless of whether the basis for subject matter
jurisdiction is diversity or a federal question. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).1621d.
163 Of course, if there are separate claims that arise out of separate factual scenarios, each
claim would have to satisfy the requirement that the defendant "could be subjected to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction."Id.
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has established jurisdiction over the defendant with regard to at least one count,
the reach of the federal court's authority under Rule 4 would be determined
according to the legislative intent and purposes of the federal procedural structure
and the constraints of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.16 Thus,
pursuant to this interpretation of Rule 4(k)(1)(A), federal courts would have
statutory authority to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction as long as the anchor
count satisfies the state long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the pendent
counts is consistent with the legislative intent of the rules of procedure governing
the federal courts-namely, that the courts are encouraged to adjudicate entire
controversies whenever possible. 165 Once Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is satisfied, the court
would then consider whether the assertion of jurisdiction over the pendent count
or counts would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
166
An alternative interpretation of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is that every count in a
complaint must independently meet the requirement that the defendant "could be
subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction.' '167 Pursuant to this
interpretation, if a state court of general jurisdiction is prohibited from
entertaining personal jurisdiction over pendent counts, then the federal court
would also be prohibited from exercising such jurisdiction. This interpretation of
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) requires an initial analysis of: (1) whether the relevant state long-
arm statute would permit a state court to exercise pendent personal jurisdiction
and (2) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the pendent count would
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. State Long-Arm Statutes
There are two types of long-arm statutes: (1) those that authorize the exercise
of personal jurisdiction under any circumstances that are consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) enumerated statutes that
authorize long-arm jurisdiction based upon particular types of conduct. When the
relevant long-arm statute mirrors the requirements of the Due Process Clause, the
statutory component of the personal jurisdiction analysis and the constitutional
component of the analysis merge together. Thus, pendent personal jurisdiction
will be permissible as long as it does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
' See infranote 113.65 See infra text accompanying notes 132-52. Even if there is a practice followed by state
courts to dismiss jurisdictionally insufficient pendent counts, one could argue that a federal
court could apply pendent personal jurisdiction if the importance of the federal interest in
adjudicating entire controversies outweighs the countervailing need for uniformity of outcome
between state and federal courts. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(195'd; See infra note 173.
167 id.
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When the relevant state long-arn statute enumerates specific conduct that
must be present to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction, a court must first
determine if the statute is satisfied with regard to one or more counts in the
complaint. If the statute is satisfied with regard to all of the counts alleged, the
court would then consider the constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction over
the counts. If the statute is satisfied with regard to some but not all counts, the
court would consider whether the statute implicitly or explicitly authorizes the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over pendent counts as a "tag along" to the
anchor count. If the long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the pendent counts,
the court would then consider whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
the pendent counts would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Determining whether a state long-arm statute authorizes pendent personal
jurisdiction-either implicitly or explicitly-is difficult because state law is
generally silent on the issue.161 In light of this general silence, a court would have
to examine the legislative history of the particular statute to determine if the
exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction were consistent with the legislative goal
of the long-arm statute or, more generally, with the state's rules of civil procedure.
To the extent that the intent of the statute could be interpreted as encouraging the
adjudication of entire controversies, one could argue that the exercise of pendent
personal jurisdiction is not inconsistent with such a goal.
If there is evidence that the state long-arm statute supports the exercise of
pendent personal jurisdiction, the next step in the analysis under Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
requires an evaluation of whether the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court's modem personal jurisdiction jurisprudence emerges
from an oft-quoted sentence in International Shoe v. Washington describing the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment as follows:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personarn, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 69
The Court has refined the minimum contacts principle by recognizing two
different types of personal jurisdiction-general and specific personal
16SElectronic database searches of the phrases "pendent personal jurisdiction,"
"supplemental personal jurisdiction," and "ancillary personal jurisdiction," retrieved no state
court cases or state statutes that incorporate these terms.
169326 U.S. 310,316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,453 (1940)).
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jurisdiction. In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, the Court described
the two categories of jurisdiction as follows:
[W]hen a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising
out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the State is
exercising "specific jurisdiction" over the defendant.... When a state exercises
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the
defendant's contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be exercising
"general jurisdiction" over the defendant'170
The threshold for satisfying the minimum contacts test in cases based on
general personal jurisdiction is significantly higher than the threshold for
satisfying minimum contacts in cases based on specific personal jurisdiction.171
This makes sense considering that the reach of general jurisdiction is much
broader-jurisdiction to adjudicate any dispute-than the reach of specific
jurisdiction which is limited to disputes that arise out of or are related to the forum
conduct.
Applying these concepts to pendent personal jurisdiction, one must first
recognize that the issue of pendent personal jurisdiction only arises when specific
personal jurisdiction is asserted over the anchor claim. This is true because
general personal jurisdiction is based upon a defendant's relationship with the
forum and if the defendant has such a significant relationship with the forum as to
give rise to general in personam jurisdiction, there is no limit on the number or
type of claims that may be brought against him in the forum. If, on the other hand,
the defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction for the anchor claim,
Helicopteros indicates that such jurisdiction provides authority for the court to
adjudicate a "suit" arising out of or related to the defendant's forum contacts. 172
Accordingly, pendent personal jurisdiction is permissible if the pendent count is
part of the "suit" that forms the basis for the court's assertion of jurisdiction over
the anchor count.
In determining whether pendent counts are part of the same "suit" as an
anchor count, one must define the characteristics of a "suit."'173 If a "suit" is
170466 U.S. 408,414-15 nn.8 & 9 (1984); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462,472 (1985). The Court stated:
Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has
not consented to suit there, this 'fair warning' requirement is satisfied if the defendant has
'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum... and the litigation results
from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities.
Id. (citations omitted).
1' FRIEDENTHAL et al., supra note 160, at 125.
"'
7 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414.
173 The Supreme Court has defined "suit" as:
[A] very comprehensive [word] ... understood to apply to any proceeding in a court
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narrowly defined as the particular legal theory that gives rise to a right of
recovery, every count must independently satisfy the minimum contacts test. If,
on the other hand, a "suit" is more broadly defined as the nucleus of operative
facts that give rise to a right of recovery, counts that fail to independently satisfy
the minimum contacts test may still be encompassed within the court's personal
jurisdiction as long as they arise out of the same factual event that gives rise to the
anchor count. Since the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the reach of
specific personal jurisdiction in these terms, 174 the Court should adopt the broader
interpretation of "suit" for several reasons. First, this interpretation is consistent
with the interpretation of "cases" and "controversies" in Article II of the
Constitution.17 s As noted previously, the Court has held that because the
Constitution confers judicial power over cases or controversies, the reach of
federal subject matter jurisdiction extends to all counts that arise out of the same
factual event as an anchor count. This reasoning is quite analogous to the
reasoning that would justify pendent personal jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of
pendent personal jurisdiction is consistent with the Court's jurisprudence
interpreting the limitations imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Many courts that have adopted pendent personal jurisdiction have done so on
the basis that the doctrine is analogous to supplemental jurisdiction. 76
Supplemental jurisdiction arises out of Article IR, which imposes strict limits on
the federal judicial power. 177 Pursuant to these limitations, a federal court is
ofjustice by which an individual pursues [a] remedy which the law affords. The modes of
proceeding may be various; but, if a right is litigated in a court ofjustice, the proceeding by
which the decision of the court is sought is a suit.
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 375 (1875) (quoting Weston v. Charleston, 27 U.S. (449
Pet.), 464 (1829)). This definition is too broad to provide a meaningful limitation on specific
jurisdiction.
174Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415, n.10 (declining to decide: (1) whether the terms "arising
out of' and "related to" describe different standards for acquiring specific jurisdiction and (2)
what type of relationship must exist between a defendant's contacts and the suit to justify the
exercise of specific jurisdiction).
175 U.S. CONsT. art. IH, § 2.
176 See, e.g., EASB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, 126 F.3d 617, 628 (4th Cir. 1997); Oetiker v.
Werke, 556 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555-56 (3d
Cir. 1973).
177 Article III provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-
between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;-
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
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prohibited from adjudicating a case that falls outside of Article I. Since the
earliest days of the federal courts, however, federal judges have stretched the
boundaries of Article M11 to accommodate jurisdictionally insufficient counts that
are closely related to, and joined with, counts that satisfy the requirements of
Article ]1. 17 1 Specifically, the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction address the need to adjudicate pendent counts as part of the federal
courts' obligation to discharge effectively its duties under the constitutional and
statutory grants of judicial power.179 In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,'" the
Court endorsed the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, noting that:
Pendent [subject matter] jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists
whenever there is... [an anchor claim within the federal court's
jurisdiction] ... and the relationship between that claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional "case"..... The state and federal claims must derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact. But, if considered without regard to their
federal or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such that he would ordinarily be
expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality
of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. That
power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist It has
consistently been recognized that pendent [subject matter] jurisdiction is a
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs right. Its justification lies in
considerations ofjudicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants; if these
are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims .... 1
Today, it is well accepted that once subject matter jurisdiction is established
over one count in a case, the reach of authority conferred by Article II extends to
the entire factual event that gave rise to the case or controversy.
8 2
A similar analysis may be used to define the reach of specific personal
jurisdiction. Specifically, once a court has acquired specific personal jurisdiction
with regard to a count, the court may exercise its discretion to extend its authority
to all counts that arise out of the same case or controversy. As is the case with
supplemental subject matter jurisdiction, the court would exercise discretion in
determining whether the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction would be
appropriate in any given case.
U.S. CONST. art. Rm, § 2.
17 8 FIDENTHAL et al., supra note 160, at 65.
1791d.
180383 U.S. 715 (1966).
'
81Id. at 725-27 (citations omitted).
182In 1990, Congress adopted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(1994), which essentially codified the doctrines of pendent and ancillary subject matter
jurisdiction. This statute provides that supplemental jurisdiction shall extend to claims that
"form part of the same case or controversy under Article Ill." Id.
16572001]
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While most courts that have applied pendent personal jurisdiction have done
so in accordance with an analysis that relies largely upon the analogy to subject
matter jurisdiction, the weakness in this argument lies in the fact that these two
types of jurisdiction serve different purposes and arise out of different
constitutional provisions.!83 Subject matter jurisdiction derives from Article I
and functions as a restriction on federal sovereign power, whereas personal
jurisdiction derives from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments and protects an individual liberty interest.184 These differences lead
to further legal consequences in the application of the doctrines. For example,
consent of the parties is irrelevant to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction
because sovereign power cannot be controlled by action of the parties.' On the
other hand, a defendant may consent or waive his or her objection to the exercise
of personal jurisdiction because personal jurisdiction is an individual right. 18 6
Moreover, to the extent that the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction rests upon
an interpretation of the case or controversy requirement this language is not
directly applicable to the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. Thus, one cannot
simply accept the constitutionality of pendent personal jurisdiction on the basis
that it is analogous to supplemental subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, it must also
be shown that the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction is consistent with the
authority conferred by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Due Process Clause permits a court to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction in two instances: (1) when a defendant consents or waives his or her
objection to personal jurisdiction or (2) when a defendant has purposeful
minimum contacts with the forum that give rise to the suit. When jurisdiction rests
upon express consent by the parties, as for example, in a forum selection clause,
the scope of jurisdiction depends upon the intent of the parties. If the forum
selection clause is enforceable as to any counts, the scope of the jurisdiction will
generally depend upon the interpretation of the agreement as opposed to
limitations imposed by due process. 8 7 Due process concerns arise, however,
when a defending party is subject to personal jurisdiction in the absence of an
express agreement. When jurisdiction rests upon implied consent waiver, or
minimum contacts, the scope of jurisdiction will be limited by due process.
When a plaintiff files a lawsuit the plaintiff requests that the court adjudicate





187See Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding the
forum selection clause enforceable and that there was no need to meet due process). But see
Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the exercise of
jurisdiction pursuant to a forum selection clause would violate the Due Process Clause with
regard to all counts raised).
1658 [Vol. 62:1619
SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION
the dispute and order relief from the defendant. In filing the complaint against the
defendant, the plaintiff impliedly consents to personal jurisdiction in that court. In
Adam v. Saenger,88 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment is not
violated when a plaintiff, who has filed suit against a defendant, is deemed to
have consented to the exercise of personal jurisdiction with regard to
counterclaims asserted by the defendant. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
considered the unfair asymmetry that would result if the plaintiff could hail a
defendant into a forum and retain immunity from suit for the defendant's
counterclaims: "The plaintiff having, by his voluntary act in demanding justice
from the defendant, submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, there is
nothing arbitrary or unreasonable in treating him as being there for all purposes
for which justice to the defendant requires his presence.' 89
Not surprisingly, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not delineate the scope of implied consent according to the legal theory pursued in
the original suit or the legal theory pursued by the defendant. Rather, the scope of
the plaintiffs implied consent is defined in terms of what would be necessary for
a fair resolution of the litigation between the parties. For example, it is well
accepted that by filing a lawsuit, a plaintiff impliedly consents to personal
jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims brought by the defendant.1 90 A
compulsory counterclaim is one which arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence as the original suit and thus involves a substantial overlap of facts with
the original suit. In terms of efficiency, consistency of judgments, and fairness,
justice is best served by allowing defendants to adjudicate compulsory
counterclaims against plaintiffs. Following this reasoning, due process is not
violated by the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff based on a theory
of implied consent.
If due process permits courts to imply consent to personal jurisdiction over
compulsory counterclaims, due process should also permit courts the discretion to
exercise pendent personal jurisdiction. First, both situations involve an anchor
count which independently satisfies the requirements of personal jurisdiction. In
the case of implied consent, the anchor count is the plaintiff s original suit hailing
the defendant into the forum. Second, both situations involve a factually related
count that is allowed to "tag along" with the anchor count. That is, the related
count is permitted solely because it is joined with a jurisdictionally sufficient
count that arises out of the same facts. In the case of implied consent, the
defendant is permitted to assert a compulsory counterclaim even if the plaintiff
'303 U.S. 59 (1938).
91d. at 67--68; see also Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. TI Reynolds 531 Ltd., 182 B.R. 526, 531
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995).
19°The plaintiff's implied consent to jurisdiction has been deemed even broader than
merely encompassing factually related counterclaims. FRIEDENTHAL et al., supra note 160, at
108. Some courts have held that a plaintiff impliedly consents to personal jurisdiction over any
counterclaim raised by a defendant, whether factually related or not.
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would not have been amenable to personal jurisdiction in the forum in the
absence of the original suit. When a court exercises pendent personal jurisdiction,
it asserts power over an otherwise jurisdictionally insufficient count because it is
joined with a jurisdictionally sufficient count that arises out of the same facts. If
due process is not violated when a plaintiff is deemed to have consented to
compulsory counterclaims, it should similarly not be violated by the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over factually related pendent counts.1 9'
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be
interpreted to limit the scope of specific jurisdiction to particular legal theories
when the basis for jurisdiction over the anchor count is minimum contacts rather
than consent. First, the Due Process Clause must be read in light of the power and
obligation imposed upon the federal courts to adjudicate cases and controversies
in Article III. If the federal courts are to discharge their duties under Article IlI,
the Due Process Clause must be broad enough to permit courts to entertain
personal jurisdiction over all counts that arise out of a common nucleus of
operative facts. Second, while the Supreme Court has never expressly addressed
the scope of specific personal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that the due
process limitations imposed upon a court's authority to exercise personal
jurisdiction must be considered in the context of the entire dispute between the
parties. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,192 the Court held that personal
jurisdiction existed to adjudicate an entire controversy where only a portion of the
controversy arose out of the defendant's forum contacts. The Court upheld the
exercise of specific jurisdiction over a multistate lawsuit seeking damages from
the nationwide circulation of a magazine even though only a small portion of the
damages arose from the defendant's conduct in the forum state. In Keeton, a
resident of New York filed a libel suit against Hustler Magazine 93 and other
defendants in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire.
The plaintiff alleged that she was libeled in five issues of the magazine, all of
which were circulated nationwide. Hustler Magazine's only contacts with New
Hampshire consisted of the sale of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 magazines in
the state each month. The Court held that the regular monthly sales of thousands
of magazines in New Hampshire would ordinarily satisfy the requirement of the
Due Process Clause for a libel claim arising out of those magazines. The Court
went on to state that:
'9' Arguably, the situations are distinguishable to the extent that a plaintiff voluntarily
chooses to bring suit in a forum, but a defendant is typically hailed into the forum involuntarily.
Both parties, however, exercise control over their jurisdictional exposure. While a plaintiff has
control over whether to file suit and thus create an "anchor" count to which counterclaims may
be joined, a defendant has control over her conduct in the forum that gives rise to minimum
contacts over the anchor count.
192465 U.S. 770 (1984).
13At the time of the litigation, Hustler Magazine, Inc. was an Ohio corporation with its
principal place of business in California. Id. at 772.
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[Mt is certainly relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry that petitioner is seeking to
recover damages suffered in all States in this one suit. The contacts between
respondent and the forum must be judged in the light of that claim, rather than a
claim only for damages sustained in New Hampshire. That is, the contacts
between respondent and New Hampshire must be such that it is "fair" to compel
respondent to defend a multistate lawsuit in New Hampshire seeking nationwide
damages for all copies of the five issues in question, even though only a small
portion of those copies were distributed in New Hampshire.' 94
Concluding that New Hampshire had an expressed interest in asserting
jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim and an interest in cooperating with other states,
the Court held that defendant's New Hampshire contacts were sufficient to
warrant the district court's exercise of jurisdiction over the multistate libel suit.'95
While the Keeton case did not involve pendent personal jurisdiction
specifically, it does provide evidence that the Due Process Clause is broad enough
to permit adjudication of entire controversies. In Keeton, the Court relied upon the
defendant's circulation of the offending magazine in New Hampshire as the
minimum contact that gave rise to the claim for damages from the circulation in
New Hampshire. 196 Once the minimum contacts test was satisfied with regard to
at least a portion of the damages sought, the Court then considered whether it
would be fair to the defendant to allow the court to adjudicate the entire case
arising out of the same factual event-the circulation of the same issues of the
magazine in states other than New Hampshire.
97
This analysis is similar to one that would be employed to determine if
personal jurisdiction should be extended to pendent counts. First, the court would
have to find jurisdiction over the anchor count. Next, the court would have to
determine whether the pendent count arose out of the same nucleus of operative
fact, thus comprising part of the same constitutional case as the anchor count.
Finally, the court would have to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction
over the pendent count would be fair to the defendant. In most instances, requiring
the defendant to defend a pendent count will not be unfair because the defendant
already will be properly before the court on one count, and therefore, the
adjudication of the factually related pendent count will not pose an unreasonable
burden.
I conclude that the present reluctance of courts to apply pendent personal
jurisdiction in conventional minimum contacts cases is not warranted. Rather,
specific personal jurisdiction is strong enough to allow courts to exercise pendent
personal jurisdiction.!9"
'
94 Id. at 775.
'
95 ld. at 777-78.
196Id. at 775.
'
97 Id. at 775 n.76.198To date, there are no published state court decisions or long-arm statutes that apply or
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VIII. CONCLUSION
During the nearly two decades since the Supreme Court recognized a
bifurcated doctrine of personal jurisdiction, it has made little progress in defining
the characteristics that distinguish general and specific jurisdiction. One of the
issues that has repeatedly evaded the Court's attention is the scope of specific
jurisdiction. While we know that the scope of general jurisdiction extends to any
suit brought against a defendant, and specific jurisdiction is limited to "suits" that
arise out of the defendant's contacts with the forum, the precise contours of
specific jurisdiction remain unclear. In recognition of this theoretical deficiency,
this article examines a particular category of cases-those involving
jurisdictionally insufficient counts that arise out of the same factual event as
jurisdictionally sufficient counts brought against the same defendant-to
illuminate the theoretical question surrounding the scope of specific jurisdiction.
The article concludes that in most instances there will be no constitutional or
statutory impediment to the federal court's exercise of pendent personal
jurisdiction regarding jurisdictionally insufficient counts that arise out of the same
constitutional case as a jurisdictionally sufficient anchor count, whether the basis
for jurisdiction over the anchor count is a nationwide service of process statute or
a state long-arm statute. Finding constitutional support for the exercise of pendent
personal jurisdiction pursuant to the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the article suggests that there is no constitutional
limitation that would require federal or state courts to define specific jurisdiction
narrowly according to particular legal theories supporting recovery. Rather, the
Due Process Clauses in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments support a
broad interpretation of specific jurisdiction that would allow a federal or state
court to adjudicate the entire constitutional case brought against a defendant. 99
refer to the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction. While it is beyond the scope of this paper
to conduct an analysis of the language of every state long-arm statute (and state constitution) to
determine if pendent personal jurisdiction would be authorized, there is no theoretical obstacle
that would preclude a state court from adopting the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction.
First, the exercise of jurisdiction must meet the standards prescribed in the state long-arm
statute. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. With regard to the first requirement, many state long-arm statutes
permit any exercise of personal jurisdiction that is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment,
thus obviating the need for a specific analysis of the long-arm. Where the relevant long-arm
statute enumerates particular conduct that must be satisfied, a state court must analyze whether
the language of the statute and the legislative history support the assertion of jurisdiction over
pendent counts. With regard to the second requirement, this paper presents support for the
conclusion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would not be violated by
the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction.
99 While this article has focused on the application of pendent personal jurisdiction in
federal court, much of the analysis that applies to pendent personal jurisdiction in traditional
minimum contacts cases filed in federal court would be the same for cases filed in state court.
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The only notable differences in the analysis would be: (1) the federal minimum contacts cases
are constitutionally limited by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (but, of course,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) requires satisfaction of the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause), whereas the state minimum contacts cases are constitutionally limited by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) any differences between the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the relevant state rules of procedure.
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